

Who Am I?
Racial Identity and Affect Among
Biracial White-Blacks and White-Asians

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Abstract

The multiple-race population of the U.S. currently stands at more than 9 million and is one of the fastest-growing racial groups in the nation. In this paper, we examine the identities, affect, and attitudes of the two largest multiple-race subgroups—biracial White-Asians and White-Blacks—and examine where they reside in the U.S. racial divide. We theorize that biracials' political attitudes may follow one of two paradigms: a *hegemonic model*, in which biracials perceive themselves as more strongly tied to Whites; and a *racial distinctiveness model*, wherein biracials view themselves as members of a minority group, socially and culturally distinct from Whites. Leveraging a novel national survey that samples more than one thousand biracial respondents, we evaluate multiple indicators of racial identity, racial affect, and policy preferences. Our findings suggest that, overall, biracials stake out a distinct identity that occasionally diverges from their heritage groups. On matters of racial attachment, biracials partially bridge the difference between their monoracial White and non-White counterparts, but overall remain close to their minority affiliation. On political issues, however, biracials generally tilt left of monoracial minority groups. We argue that the growth in the multiple-race population, at least in terms of the groups considered here, seems likely to benefit the Democratic Party, unless the Republican Party abandons their hard-line stance on issues of concern to racial minority communities.

1 Introduction

In democratic societies, politics revolves around group interests. Subjective group identification—an internalized feeling of belonging to a group—is integral to understanding the politicization of group membership (Huddy 2001, 2002, 2003). Group identification can result in a heightened state of group consciousness, characterized by in-group solidarity, opposition to the out-group, awareness of the group’s social status, and a commitment to action intended to achieve the group’s goals (Jackman and Jackman 1973; Gurin, Miller and Gurin 1980; Miller et al. 1981).

In the case of the United States, the racial group cleavage has been especially influential, and racial group interests have long been at the forefront of electoral and party politics (Mendelberg 2001; Hutchings and Valentino 2004; Kinder and Winter 2001). Importantly, the literature on racial identity and consciousness has traditionally assumed that the racial cleavage is binary—pitting the interests of the dominant White group against the interests of non-Whites (McClain et al. 2009; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Sniderman and Carmines 1997). Recent demographic trends, however, indicate that the racial divide is becoming increasingly nuanced (Bonilla-Silva 2006; Lee and Bean 2010).

A more complex sense of identity is especially applicable to individuals of mixed-race backgrounds, who represent the youngest and one of the fastest-growing racial demographics. At present, the multiple-race population of the U.S. stands at more than 9 million (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2013). Between 2000 and 2013, the number of Americans identifying with multiple racial groups increased by 37 percent (Davenport 2015). Demographers project that by 2050, people of mixed-racial backgrounds will account for 20 percent of the total U.S. population (Lee and Bean 2004; Humes, Jones and Ramirez 2011).

In this paper, we examine the identities, affect, and attitudes of biracial Americans, and where they reside in the U.S. racial divide. We focus on the two largest American multiple-race populations—biracial White-Blacks and biracial White-Asians—who together comprise 45 percent of the current multiple-race population (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2013). These are also the fastest-growing multiple-race subgroups; between 2000 and 2013, the number of Americans identifying as White-Asian and White-Black increased by 112 percent and 207 percent, respectively—compared to an increase of just 11.7 percent among the single-race identifying population (Davenport 2015).

We pursue two primary objectives in this paper. First, we compare the attitudinal profile of White-Asian and White-Black biracials with the respective profiles of the monoracial groups from which they derive. Specifically, we examine differences in strength of racial attachments and affect between groups. Second, we explore the broader political ramifications associated with dual ethnicity. Given the extent to which the constituencies of Democrats and Republicans are differentiated by race, increasing numbers of biracial voters who identify more strongly as non-White than White would seem to advantage the Democratic Party, in light of recent electoral racial trends. On the other hand, if the preferences of biracials fall exactly in between the views of monoracial Whites and non-Whites, both parties may reasonably appeal for their support. We examine which of these outcomes seems more plausible.

To accomplish these objectives, we leverage a novel national survey that samples more than one thousand biracial respondents. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first large-scale political survey of multiple-race adults that enables such a robust assessment of particular biracial subgroups. Previous studies, even those that oversampled multiracial individuals, did not permit a fine-grained comparative analysis of racial attitudes, since multiracial respondents only numbered

a few hundred, in total (e.g., Masuoka 2011; Harris and Sim 2002).¹ In contrast, our study includes 720 White-Black biracials and 509 White-Asian biracials. For purposes of comparison, we also surveyed the three relevant constituent monoracial groups, including 800 Whites, 500 Blacks, and 500 Asians.

Our findings indicate that Biracial White-Asians locate themselves in-between Whites and Asians on questions relating to racial identity and affect. White-Black biracials, however, show no such ambivalence, positioning themselves with monoracial Blacks on questions of group identity. The two groups' sense of group identity spills over to the policy domain with both biracial groups expressing preferences that signify a likelihood of voting for Democrats rather than Republicans.

2 Models of Racial Identity

In order to understand the political consequences of racial identity for biracial Americans, we turn to behavioral theories in social psychology and political science. Most notably, Social Identity Theory (SIT) argues that individuals' sense of social identity—their subjective affiliation with particular social groups—powerfully shapes their political attitudes and behaviors (Tajfel and Turner 1986; Tajfel 1981; Hogg and Hardie 1992; Ellemers, Spears and Doosje 1997; Conover 1984). This would suggest that individuals of mixed-race backgrounds will adopt the ideology of the racial group with which they most strongly identify (Tajfel and Turner 1979). Central to explaining the political behavior and racial affect of biracial Americans, then, is mapping the direction and intensity of their racial group attachments. Unlike most Americans, who have only one racial identity in their repertoire of social identities, biracials are afforded some flexibility,

¹Though see Davenport (2015), who examines the attitudes of biracial college students across the United States.

enabling them multiple racial options and the capacity to fit into different racial memberships.

Because their background includes both minority (Asian or Black) and majority (White) racial ancestry, we theorize that biracials' political attitudes may follow one of two racial identity paradigms. The first is a *hegemonic model*, in which biracials perceive themselves as more strongly connected to the dominant majority group (Whites) than to their minority heritage. The second is a *racial distinctiveness model* positing that biracials view themselves as members of a racial minority group, socially and culturally distinct from Whites. We elaborate on these two models of biracial identity below.

2.1 Hegemonic Model

The hegemonic model of identity predicts that biracials are socialized to see themselves as members of the dominant racial group—White. The model can be traced to the early theorizing of Marx and Gramsci on the self-perpetuating nature of social hierarchies (e.g. Borg, Buttigieg and Mayo 2002), and also to more recent empirical work on the role of pre-adult socialization processes in maintaining system legitimacy (e.g. Easton and Dennis 1969). A closely related perspective is Social Dominance Orientation (SDO), which theorizes that politics and society are organized hierarchically around intergroup competition over scarce and symbolic resources (Sidanius, Sing, Hetts and Federico 2000). According to SDO, a central role that political ideologies play is to preserve the social hierarchy and maintain the position of the dominant group.

The hegemonic model is also consistent with Tajfel and Turner's (1979) argument that social identity is motivated by a need for positive distinctiveness, by which one's own group is favorably differentiated from out-groups. Hegemonic theory holds that group identity and in-group bias are especially well-developed among members of high-status groups because they are positively

differentiated from lower-status groups (Bettencourt et al. 2001). In contrast, group identity is not as well-developed among members of less prestigious groups, who must cultivate an affirmative identity or seek to change the group's negative standing in order to enhance their social status (Tajfel and Turner 1979).

A further prediction of the hegemonic model is that individuals whose social standing is in flux will choose to identify with the dominant group. That is, individuals for whom membership in a low-status group is permeable can “escape” their status deprivation by affiliating with a different, higher-status group (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Tajfel 1981; Tajfel and Turner 1986). Several studies have found support for this strategy of upwardly mobile identity (Jackson et al. 1996, Taylor et al. 1987, Wright, Taylor and Moghaddam 1990).

We argue that because part-White, biracial Americans have some degree of choice as to how they racially identify, the boundaries for their classification are indeed more permeable than for those of monoracials. Although people of mixed White, non-White backgrounds have historically been socially and legally identified with their minority race (Snipp 2003; Davis 2001; Bureau of the Census 1930), attitudes towards racial classification have evolved over time, such that the definition of Whiteness has expanded to encompass racial and ethnic groups that had long-been legally categorized as non-White (Gans 2012; Bonilla-Silva 2006). Notably, Davenport (2016*b*) finds that economic prosperity, in the form of parental education, household income, and neighborhood wealth, has an especially upwardly-mobile, racial “whitening” effect for individuals of White/non-White parentage; in particular, affluent White-Asian biracials are, all else equal, more likely to self-identify as White, than as Asian. These findings may be attributed to what Loveman and Muniz (2007) characterize as “boundary crossing: as biracials obtain social status through the acquisition of education and affluence, they are able to traverse racial boundaries and be classified

as White by others, which in turn shapes how they view themselves.

Thus, based on this hegemonic or dominant group model of identity, we hypothesize that biracial Americans will more strongly align themselves with their majority race—White—because affiliation with the higher-status group reflects well on them and is a way to enhance their social status.

2.2 Racial Distinctiveness Model

An alternative possibility is that biracials' identities and attitudes are more consistent with efforts to distinguish themselves from Whites. McGuire and Padawer-Singer (1976)'s distinctiveness theory of self perception maintains that the characteristics we observe most in ourselves are those that are especially conspicuous in our social milieu; if an individual has a particular trait that is distinctive, it will become a spontaneously salient component of that individual's self-concept. Distinctiveness theory attributes our self-consciousness to the fact that we are dissimilar from others in some way and that we perceive ourselves in terms of these distinguishing qualities (McGuire et al. 1978). Distinctiveness shapes the self-concept via both internal and external comparison. That is, people notice their own uniqueness by contrasting their traits to those of others in their social setting, and are also affected by others' responses and perceptions regarding their uniqueness. Individuals are more likely to notice within themselves features that are absent among those around them. Notably, McGuire et al. (1978) show that ethnic identity is a salient part of one's self-concept when his or her ethnic group is in the minority in their social setting; in an ethnically mixed environment, members of minority groups express a greater consciousness of their ethnicity than members of the majority group.

In keeping with traditional racial norms such as the one-drop rule, the ethnic distinctiveness

postulate predicts that, as members of an oppressed racial group, part-White biracials will compare themselves to the dominant (White) population and perceive themselves as a distinct group. That is, in light of their part-Asian or part-Black heritage, biracials will distinguish themselves from Whites, viewing White as a racial category that is closed-off to them. Biracials' minority status socially differentiates them from Whites, making them more conscious of being non-White than White. Because they do not or cannot seek entry into the dominant White group, biracials' non-Whiteness becomes salient, and their identity with the minority side of their ancestry is reinforced.

We hypothesize that if biracials do identify as members of a marginalized racial minority group that is distinct from Whites, they may follow one of two divergent paths, either: a.) identifying with and behaving in a manner akin to that of their monoracial minority race, or b.) perceiving themselves as part of a unique, multiple-race minority group whose behavior veers from both of their component parental races.

On the one hand, historical racial norms would imply that biracials are more likely to socially and politically identify with their minority race. In keeping with the distinctiveness model, there is a longstanding tradition of mixed-race Americans socially and politically identifying with their more "subordinate" minority racial group. In particular, for most of U.S. history, individuals of African ancestry were categorized and treated in accordance with the one-drop rule, or hypodescent, and considered to be singularly Black, rather than "multiracial," "biracial," or "part-White" (Davis 2001). There is similarly a long tradition of individuals of Asian descent being legally classified as non-White (Haney-Lopez 2006).

Although the one-drop rule no longer judicially delineates racial group membership in the 21st century, it continues to informally structure how people of mixed-race are labeled. Despite their part-White background, biracials are commonly categorized as simply "people of color" because

observers unconsciously draw upon hypodescent when making racial inferences. Studies have shown, for instance, that White-Asian biracial faces and White-Black biracial faces are judged to be relatively more “minority” than White (Ho et al. 2011). Similarly, when individuals are tasked with classifying White-Black biracial faces that appear phenotypically ambiguous, they are more inclined to label the target as Black (Peery and Bodenhausen 2008).

Davenport (2016*b*) finds that biracials who self-identify as singular racial minorities or as multiracial tend to perceive a stronger linked fate with their minority race because they see themselves as facing similar adversities and prejudices encountered by their monoracial minority peers. Such research underscores the endurance of the one-drop rule in structuring racial group membership. In light of these findings, that contemporary part-White biracials tend to be externally classified with their minority race, it would seem that such individuals would see their identities as more closely aligned with that of their minority rather than White affiliation.

On the other hand, it is plausible that biracials identify as a racial minority group that behaves differently from either of their component races, in a manner consistent with the seminal “marginal man” hypothesis. First developed in the 1920s, this hypothesis posits that “racial hybrids”—particularly those individuals of White-Black ancestry—straddle a fraught color line and are in a one-of-a-kind social position wherein they are influenced by each of their parental racial groups (Stonequist 1935). The marginal man hypothesis maintains that even if an individual has a stronger attachment to a particular racial background, he or she is mindful of a social connection to the other culture, in part because of a physical resemblance to both races and being identified by others as of mixed-race heritage.

According to this view, although mixed-race people naturally reside in two distinct social realms, they are not embraced by either. As a result, these individuals are in a perpetual “period

of crisis” (Park 1928, 893) and comprise their own distinctive minority group. Thus, as Stonequist (1935, 4) argues, “the type of life he leads, the nature of his achievements or failures, his conception of himself, and his social attitudes will inevitably reflect the fact that he is of mixed race, and whatever that fact means in any particular community.”

2.3 Racial Subgroup Differences in Identity

We also anticipate that there will be important differences in identity and political attitudes across biracial subgroups. Although hypodescent structures the classification of both Black and Asian biracials, racial boundaries have always been less strictly enforced for Americans of Asian descent (Davis 2001; Haney-Lopez 2006). As a result, we anticipate that group consciousness will manifest itself differently among biracial White-Blacks and White-Asians.

Relative to other American racial and ethnic groups, the strength and stability of Black American political solidarity is exceptional, based as it is on the legacy of government-authorized enslavement, segregation, and discrimination (Shelby 2005; Du Bois 1903). The concept of linked fate—the extent to which an individual believes the social status of her group is tied to her own individual achievements and welfare—has been a fundamental element for explaining Black political behavior and attitudes (Dawson 1994). The collective experience of deprivation and suffering is an essential component of African American group consciousness (Gay 2004), and as such, individual Blacks generally perceive their own fate as inseparable from those of other Blacks (Dawson 1994). The result of more than a century of racial oppression, Blacks perceive that what happens to their group has real consequences for the individual.

Like African Americans, Asian Americans also encounter racial prejudice, and there is some evidence that they too can be politically mobilized when their marginalization becomes salient.

For Asian Americans, the perception of racial discrimination is an important predictor of a pan-ethnic group consciousness (Masuoka 2006). The racism and stereotyping that Asians encounter, along with their collective labeling as a racial “other,” helps construct and strengthen an Asian political identity and sense of group solidarity (Espiritu 1992).

Importantly, though, the sense of linked fate is weaker among Asian Americans than African Americans (Bobo and Johnson 2000). Although they too are categorized as non-White, Asians do not share in African Americans’ harsh history of enslavement and Jim Crow segregation, and as such are less inclined to subscribe to a racially-based sense of group linked fate (Wong 2006). Three-quarters of Asian Americans are foreign-born, immigrating from several different nations (Krogstad and Lopez 2014; Pew 2012). Junn and Masuoka (2008) find that whereas 80 percent of African Americans claim that their race is important to their political identity, less than 50 percent of Asians share this view. Because the Asian American population is divided by language, ethnicity, and nationality, politicians and parties have difficulty mobilizing them as a panethnic political constituency (Junn and Masuoka 2008; Wong 2015). Individual characteristics including national origin, age, and gender prove more significant than racial considerations in shaping Asian American vote choice (Ramakrishnan et al. 2009), and the extent to which Asians see themselves as linked to their racial group fluctuates substantially by national origin (Lien 2001a).

In light of the distinct histories of these two racial groups, we anticipate that biracial White-Blacks and White-Asians will differ significantly in the strength of their identity. There is evidence that part-Black biracials also subscribe to a strong sense of African American linked fate, and favor policies targeted toward helping marginalized groups (Davenport 2016*a*; Masuoka 2011). Davenport (2015) finds that, compared to biracial White-Asians and Latino-Whites, biracial White-Blacks are more inclined to follow their minority racial background on issues of race, a result that

can be attributed to the fact that Black heritage has been a much stronger determinant of the individual’s life chances than ties to other racial and ethnic minority groups.

Relative to Black Americans of mixed-race, Asian Americans of mixed-race have always been afforded greater flexibility in their self-identification, and White-Asian biracials are more likely to call themselves White than are White-Black biracials (Davenport 2016*b*).²

Zhou (2004) argues that Asian Americans, who have achieved the educational and financial success of Whites, equate Whiteness with economic prosperity and prestige. However, Asian Americans remain culturally differentiated from Whites and for most, who do not have any European ancestry, “White” is not seen as an acceptable racial identification option. But for biracial White-Asians, who share Whites socioeconomic successes and also European ancestry, the ability to claim a White racial identity is a real possibility.

3 Data and Methods

3.1 Defining “Biracial”

One consistent issue that researchers of racial and ethnic identity grapple with is, how should concepts like “multiple-race,” “mixed-race,” “multiracial,” and “biracial” be defined? We recognize that race is a flexible, contextual, and constructed social category, and that, as such, racial terminology can be delineated in several ways.³ Here, we define respondents as “biracial” if they

²The percentage for both groups is nevertheless small: ten percent of White-Asian biracials self-identify as White, compared to just five percent of White-Black biracials.

³For instance, many surveys, including the U.S. Census, use the method of self-identification, classifying individuals as “multiple-race” if they select two or more races in response to the race question. Other survey organizations (e.g., Pew Research Center (Pew 2015)) and social science

report having mixed-race Asian *and* White, or Black *and* White, heritage. We thus utilize the term “biracial” to designate individuals of mixed racial *ancestry*—not those who necessarily *label* themselves with multiple racial groups. In characterizing “biracial” in this way, we seek to have a more inclusive definition of the term: one that does not omit people of mixed heritage who identify with a single racial group, or those who are “second” or “third” generation multiracials. In doing so, we hope to avoid essentializing race by employing an expansive categorization of “biracial” that includes people who report having any mixed-race ancestry—even if they do not mark multiple races to designate their identity.

3.2 Sampling the Biracial Population

We overcome the scarcity problem inherent in RDD samples by oversampling biracials from the massive online panel maintained by YouGov, an international market research firm that specializes in online polling and has pioneered the development of web-based panels as instruments for social scientific research (for an overview of online research panels, see Vavreck and Iyengar (2005)). The company uses a matching methodology for delivering online samples that mirror target adult populations on key demographic attributes. In general terms, their approach mimics a random probability sample by taking as the population a large pool (panel) of respondents who have agreed to participate in Internet surveys conducted by the survey organization. To ensure that the respondents in the panel are as diverse as possible, they are recruited by multiple means, mostly through different forms of online advertising, but also by telephone-to-web and mail-to-researchers (e.g., Rockquemore and Brunnsma 2008; Khanna 2011; Allen, Garriott, Reyes and Hsieh 2013; Wardle 1992; Nishimura 1995) define “biracial” individuals as those who report their parents or grandparents to be of different races.

web recruitment. The YouGov U.S. panel includes more than one million participants, making it possible to recruit over one thousand mixed-race adult respondents with particular combinations of ethnic heritage.⁴

3.3 Measuring Racial Identity

Since group consciousness and social identity are multifaceted concepts, there is no single standard approach to measuring them and psychologists have developed multiple indicators (Huddy 2013, Sanchez 2006). The relevant measures include the sense of belonging to a group, positive feelings for the in group and negative feelings for the out group, and the importance of group membership (Cameron 2004). For their part, political scientists have measured racial group consciousness through feelings of closeness to in-group members, the belief in linked fate, and perceptions of group discrimination (McClain et al. 2009).

In our study, we deploy multiple indicators of racial identity and group consciousness, and use three different measures to assess our respondents' subjective identification with three racial groups – Whites, Asians, and Blacks: the degree to which they express linked fate to different racial groups, the degree to which individuals feel close to different racial groups, and the salience

⁴YouGov first identified every member of their panel who had checked multiple boxes on the Census Bureau's racial identity question. Each of them was then asked to select the particular pairing of their parents' ethnicity from a list consisting of five different racial categories. Those who selected the African-American and White, and Asian and White categories were then invited to participate in this survey. It is important to note that the definition of Asian is limited to people of Japanese, Chinese, Korean, and East Asian origins; we thus exclude people from the Indian sub-continent and Sri Lanka.

of their racial background to their sense of identity. We describe these indicators below.

(1) Our first measure of identity derives from Dawson’s (1994) conception of linked fate. Biracial White-Black and monoracial Black respondents indicated their level of agreement or disagreement with the statement, “as things get better for African-Americans in general, things get better for me.” We directed two parallel questions, referencing Asian Americans and White Americans, to our Asian, White, and biracial White-Asian respondents (*linked fate*).

(2) Perceived closeness is a standard political science measure of group identification (Huddy 2013). It is also a central component of group consciousness (Miller et al. 1981). Respondents indicated the degree to which they felt close to each racial group (*closeness*), with responses ranging from not at all close to very close.

(3) Our final indicator of identity assesses the salience of race to individuals’ sense of self. Identity salience, as proposed by the social identity theorists, is a crucial component of group identity and solidarity (Turner et al. 1987). Children whose ethnic identity is salient are more likely to describe themselves in terms of their ethnicity (McGuire et al. 1978). Group salience also strengthens the political impact of group identity (Huddy 2013), and promotes the advancement of in-group bias (Mullen, Brown, and Smith 1992). Respondents rated the importance of several personal attributes including their racial background “to your sense of personal identity.” The non-racial traits included gender, age, religion, political beliefs, and occupation. To assess the relative salience of race, we took the average importance (scored on a 0-1 metric) attributed to the non-racial attributes and subtracted it from the salience of race (*salience*). Positive scores indicate that race is assigned more importance than non-racial attributes.

3.4 Racial Affect

We included indicators of overt and covert racism in the survey instrument. In the case of the former, we asked respondents to rate the applicability of a series of traits to Blacks, Asians, and Whites. The positive traits included “high achievers in school,” “value work over pleasure,” and “self-reliant.” The pejorative traits included “lack moral values,” “involved in drugs and gangs,” and “insist on special privileges.” We rescaled the trait ratings to range from 0-1 (where 1 means applicability of the trait), averaged across the positive and negative ratings, and then took the difference in the two averages (*stereotyping*). Positive scores indicate greater applicability of positive over negative traits to the group in question, i.e. favorable stereotypes.

Our measure of covert racism is the standard four-item racial resentment scale (Kinder and Sanders 1996). Respondents indicated their agreement or disagreement with statements that Blacks were lacking in work ethic, or conversely, held back by discriminatory practices. We rescored the items to range from 0 to 1 and calculated the average across items. The higher the score, the more racially resentful the individual (*resentment*).

Disguising the racial content of survey questions is one way of eliciting an admission of racial bias from survey respondents. But the disguised measures suffer from liabilities, most notably, their tendency to conflate racial prejudice with political ideology.⁵ Not surprisingly, there are many (e.g., Carmines, Sniderman, and Easter, 2011) who question the validity of racial resentment as measure of racial prejudice per se.

⁵For example, people who obtain high scores on the resentment measure believe in the greater efficacy of individual effort over governmental intervention, beliefs also associated with political conservatism (Sniderman and Carmines 1997).

Social psychologists have devised an alternative solution to the problem of measuring sensitive racial attitudes. They rely on “implicit” measures of racial bias that are not subject to cognitive control or masking and bypass the asking of questions entirely. One such approach is subliminal priming in which study participants are provided fleeting exposure to words suggestive of racial stereotypes (e.g. “ghetto”). Despite the fact that the words have not entered consciousness, the priming manipulation elicits higher levels of race bias suggesting that racial prejudice is automatic or independent of consciousness (Fazio and Dutton, 1997; Wittenbrink et al., 1997).

The most widely-used and validated measure of implicit racial bias is the Implicit Association Test, which assesses the speed with which individuals associate racial categories, such as Black and White, with words representing good and bad.⁶ Since ingrained associations are more accessible, they can be made faster and with fewer errors. Based on this insight, the IAT compares the time taken to respond to pairings of White+Good and Black+Bad with the opposite Group+Attribute pairings such as Black+Good and White+Bad. Implicit racial bias is assessed by subtracting the response times for stereotype consistent pairings (e.g., Black paired with Bad and White paired

⁶The validation tests typically compare IAT scores with behavioral indicators of discrimination. For example, Dovidio et al. (2002) found that Whites’ implicit attitudes predicted their non-verbal behavior toward Blacks in a classroom task setting, while survey measures only predicted their verbal behavior. Towles-Schwen and Fazio (2006) found that anti-Black implicit attitudes of White freshmen who had been randomly assigned a Black roommate, predicted the stability and duration of the roommate relationships. Green et al. (2007), showed that physicians’ IAT scores predicted sensitivity to a patient’s race when treating heart disease, and Rooth (2010) found that implicit measures of anti-Muslim stereotypes among Swedish hiring managers predicted the decision to interview Swedes over Arab and Muslim job applicants.

with Good) from the response times for stereotype incompatible pairings (e.g., Black paired with Good and White paired with Bad). Positive scores on the IAT represent faster associations when Black is paired with Bad and White with Good (compared to the inverse), while negative values represent faster sorting when Black is paired with good and White is paired with bad. In short, positive IAT scores represent ingrained or implicit bias against Blacks. An effect size, or "D score," that ranges from -2 to 2 is calculated for each participant based on this difference (for additional details on scoring, see Greenwald et al., 2003).

In this paper, we use two different IATs: the standard version measuring implicit bias toward Blacks, and the second substituting Asians for Blacks. In this White-Asian IAT, the target group categories are represented by faces of Asian and White males (the identical faces used in the White-Black IAT), while the positive and negative words remain the same. The scoring protocol is identical across the two IATs, with positive scores representing anti-minority prejudice and negative scores representing implicit prejudice against Whites.

The full version of the IAT takes more than 15 minutes to complete. We rely on the brief version of the test (the BIAT) which consists of fewer trials and can be completed in less than ten minutes. As in the full version, the D score in the BIAT focuses on the association between positive and negative words and the target racial categories. Again, positive scores – reflecting implicit pro-White or anti-Black (or anti-Asian) sentiment – indicate faster association of positive words and White faces relative to positive words and Black/Asian faces, and faster association of negative words with Black/Asian faces relative to negative words and White faces (for further details on the BIAT scoring procedure, see Sriram & Greenwald, 2009).

In summary, we have multiple measures of two sets of racial attitudes, both assessing individuals' psychological affinity toward racial groups. In all cases, we can estimate the precise attitudinal

gap or identity distance between multiracials, on the one hand, and the mono-racial groups that define them, on the other. As we show below, mixed-race Blacks are much closer to Blacks than Whites in their sense of racial identity and related evaluations of racial groups. Mixed-race Asians, however, are somewhat more conflicted in their attitudes and often show dissimilarity with both Whites and Asians.

3.5 Political Attitudes and Policy Preferences

Obviously, the changing ethnic diversity of the electorate can alter the electoral balance of power. Given the strong divergence in political views between Blacks and Whites, we have strong grounds for expecting mixed-race Blacks to tilt Democratic. Asians also lean toward the Democratic Party and we might anticipate, given the groups under consideration, that the main partisan cleavage will pit Whites against non-Whites.

We consider four indicators of political leanings. First, we examined the question of sorting. Respondents were asked for their sense of party affiliation and liberal-conservative ideology. Over the past decade, partisanship and ideology have increasingly become reinforcing rather than cross-cutting ties as the number of conservative Democrats and liberal Republicans has dwindled. Here we focus on sorted Democrats (there are insufficient non-White Republicans to do serious analysis on both sides of the party divide) and define sorted Democrats as those who also identify as liberal.

We also examine two measures of policy preferences corresponding to the two major dimensions on which the parties diverge: social welfare issues, and issues of cultural values. For the former, we asked respondents whether they supported Obamacare and whether they preferred that the federal government provide more or fewer social services. We combined the two questions to create a measure of social welfare liberalism. High scorers favor Obamacare and want more services, low

scorers oppose both, and the middle category reflects conflicting views on these issues. We did the same for the cultural divide, combining support for gay marriage and abortion into an indicator of cultural liberalism.

Finally, scrutiny of police behavior and media attention toward cases of police mistreatment and extrajudicial killings of Black individuals have increased since George Zimmerman’s 2013 acquittal in the shooting of Trayvon Martin. In light of the concomitant growth of the “Black Lives Matter” movement—which has been concentrated within the African-American community—we felt it appropriate to ask respondents about their views on police treatment of minorities. Responses to this question ranged from Excellent to Poor and were rescaled to range from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating more negative views of police treatment.

4 Results

4.1 Racial Identity

Table 1 displays the percentage of respondents within each racial category agreeing that race is important to their personal identity, or reporting high levels of closeness and linked fate to the three monoracial groups. From Table 1, it is clear that race is far more salient for non-Whites and biracials. In line with prior research, monoracial Blacks consistently report strong attachments to their racial group. They are nearly 47 percentage points more likely than monoracial Whites to report that race is important to their personal identity, and over 80% of Blacks report feeling close to members of their racial group and believe their fate is linked. Monoracial Asians report comparable levels of closeness to their racial group and the second highest levels of racial salience. Although their sense of linked fate is weaker than that of monoracial Blacks, the difference is

surprisingly small when compared to findings from past research (Junn and Masuoka 2008).

Biracial White-Blacks and White-Asians are approximately 25 percentage points more likely than Whites to report that their racial identity is important. Although they express a stronger sense of linked fate with their minority affiliation than with Whites, they feel similarly close to both reference groups. In contrast, monoracial Whites report the lowest salience of racial identity,⁷ and they are 15 percentage points less likely than monoracial Blacks to express a sense of racial linked fate. Note, however, that the proportion of monoracial Whites who feel close to their racial group is higher than that of monoracial Blacks.

	WHITE	WHITE-BLACK	WHITE-ASIAN	BLACK	ASIAN
Salience of Race	35.7%	62.6%	60.3%	83.0%	68.5%
Linked Fate to Whites	65.2	43.0	55.1	-	-
Linked Fate to Blacks	-	76.7	-	80.5	-
Linked Fate to Asians	-	-	67.3	-	75.0
Closeness to Whites	89.6	76.8	81.3	54.7	63.8
Closeness to Blacks	42.7	77.7	30.0	86.4	28.9
Closeness to Asians	47.3	43.7	80.9	37.4	86.5

Table 1: Racial Identity by Racial Background. Percentages reflect responses that race is “Fairly important” or “Very important” to one’s personal identity; agreement that one’s fate is linked to different racial groups; and the number responding “Fairly close” or “Very close” to different racial groups on the closeness question.

Of course, the five racial groups differ on many background characteristics other than race, and race may not be the only salient feature of their identity. Figure 1 presents regression estimates of the salience of racial identity relative to other background traits. Accounting for these other features and statistically controlling for demographic differences, we find that non-Whites and biracials are indeed more likely than monoracial Whites to see race as important to their sense of identity. Surprisingly, when controlling for these correlates, we also find that monoracial Asians are just as likely as monoracial Blacks to believe race is important, with biracial Asians locating

⁷Only 12% report that race is “Very important” to their personal identity.




Figure 1: Regression Estimates of Relative Salience of Race to Personal Identity. *Note:* Higher values of the dependent variable indicate greater relative salience of race to respondent’s personal identity. Error bars reflect 95% confidence intervals. Bold segments represent 90% confidence intervals.

themselves between their two affiliation groups. Although the results indicate that White-Black and White-Asian biracials are more likely to think of themselves in racial terms than Whites, these results alone cannot speak to whether those racial identities are singularly White, singularly minority, or distinctly biracial.

The regression estimates of the sense of linked fate in Figure 2 shed light on this question. Clearly, biracials are less likely than monoracial Whites to believe that their treatment as individuals is contingent on the treatment of other Whites. But biracials are also less likely than non-Whites to link their fate to treatment of their monoracial minority group. To get a sense of the relative strength of these identities, we can compare the predicted probability of a biracial respondent “somewhat” or “strongly” agreeing that their fate is linked to each group. Here the question poses a direct competition between their dual ethnicities as each biracial group compared their personal outcomes to group outcomes accruing to both their parental groups. The results of the competition proved quite one-sided. As expected, the sense of linked fate proved much stronger for their minority affiliation than with their affiliation with the dominant racial group. Biracial Asians are considerably more likely to express linked fate with monoracial Asians (.60

than monoracial Whites (.36). Among biracial Blacks, the difference between these perceived ties is even greater (.43 versus .74).




Figure 2: Ordered Logistic Regression Estimates of Linked Fate to Major Racial Groups. *Note:* Higher values of the dependent variable indicate greater perceived linked fate to the target group. Error bars reflect 95% confidence intervals. Bold segments represent 90% confidence intervals.

The linked fate results replicate when we consider perceived closeness to different racial groups, in Figure 3. Biracials are less likely than monoracial Whites to feel close to Whites, and more likely to feel close to their minority reference group. However, because all groups were asked about closeness to each of the three major racial groups, we can compare biracial Blacks and Asians to their monoracial minority counterparts. Both biracial groups were more likely to express feelings of closeness to Whites than monoracial Blacks and Asians. White-Blacks were slightly less likely than monoracial Blacks to report closeness to their racial in-group. However, the corresponding difference between White-Asians and monoracial Asians was close to zero. The takeaway here is that biracial groups place themselves closer to the non-White than White element of their lineage.

The closeness gap between biracials and Whites on closeness to Whites was considerably larger than the gap between biracials and their non-White heritage group on closeness to Blacks and Asians. Because Blacks register by far the lowest level of closeness to whites (.53), this is the one indicator on which White-Blacks fall closer to Whites.

Extrapolating across the multiple indicators of identity, it is clear that biracial Blacks distinguish themselves from Whites and identify more as Blacks. This pattern also applies, but not as strongly, to biracial Asians. Taken together, these results are consistent with the racial distinctiveness hypothesis. When considering their racial identity, biracials align themselves with their minority heritage. In a society with a long tradition of racial inequality, biracial Americans take pains to avoid identifying with the “oppressor” group. However, the evidence also reveals that biracials see themselves as dissimilar from non-White monoracial groups, suggesting that in some cases theirs is a hybrid identity. Although biracials are more likely to resemble their non-White minority reference group, their racial attachments are slightly weaker.

4.2 Racial Affect

The differences across the five groups in the overt and covert racial affect measures appear in Figures 4 and 5. The location of the five groups generally mirrors their positioning on the identity dimension, with notable differences between biracials and monoracial Blacks and Whites. Beginning with racial stereotypes, it is clear that anti-Black prejudice is strongest among Asians, Whites, and White-Asians, who associate Blacks with negative rather than positive traits (regression-adjusted stereotype means between -.13 and -.12). Biracial White-Blacks, on the other hand, hold the most favorable stereotype of Blacks (.08), suggesting that they are just as much members of the in-group as monoracial Blacks (.07). Interestingly, biracial Blacks’ stereotypes of Blacks are slightly




Figure 3: Ordered Logistic Regression Estimates of Closeness to Major Racial Groups. Higher values of the dependent variable indicate greater perceived closeness to the target group. Error bars reflect 95% confidence intervals. Bold segments represent 90% confidence intervals.

more positive than their stereotype of Whites. Overall, the stereotype ratings suggest that in their evaluations of Whites and Blacks, biracial White-Blacks cannot be distinguished from their monoracial counterparts.

In contrast to the generally unflattering stereotype of Blacks, and in keeping with prior research (see Masuoka & Junn, 2013), virtually everyone considers Asians a “model minority.” Once again, in-group affect is slightly higher among the biracial group (mean = 1.10), but not significantly more positive than that held by monoracial Asians (mean = 1.07). More generally, 4, biracial White-Asians and Asians position themselves closer to Whites than to Blacks on affect toward non-White groups. However, the proximity is less a symptom of “Whiteness” on the part of biracial and monoracial Asians than it is attributable to Whites’ negative stereotype of Blacks

and overwhelmingly favorable stereotype of Asians (mean = 1.07). What is especially striking is that Blacks' and Whites' views of Asians are far more favorable than their own in-group rating. For Whites, views of Asians are almost ten times more favorable than their stereotype of Whites (mean = .11)! For Blacks, the imbalance in group stereotypes is even more startling: their ratings of Asians are fifteen times more positive than their ratings of fellow Blacks.




Figure 4: Regression Estimates of Overt Racial Affect. *Note:* Higher values of the dependent variable indicate more positive stereotypes of the target group. Error bars reflect 95% confidence intervals. Bold segments represent 90% confidence intervals.

Compared to the stereotype questions, racial resentment represents a less malevolent view of Blacks. Rather than asking respondents to associate low academic achievement, immorality, and criminality with African-Americans, the questions constituting the resentment index are limited to Blacks' commitment to the work ethic and self-help. Expressing resentment therefore requires less "difficulty" than expressing a harsh stereotype. When examining the unadjusted means, Whites'

and Asians' level of racial resentment easily exceeds their tendency to stereotype Blacks negatively. Whites' unadjusted mean resentment score of .69 is more than two-thirds of the way toward the maximum score possible. However, their regression-adjusted mean net Black stereotype score (-.12) and racial resentment score (.52) both fall closer to the midpoint of their respective scales. The resentment scale also divides Asians from Blacks; on this measure of anti-Black animus, Asians once again align themselves with Whites. Unsurprisingly, on the other side of the race divide, Blacks and White-Blacks have half to two-thirds the level of resentment as Whites.

Finally, we turn to our implicit measures of racial bias. Recall that IAT scores greater than the midpoint of 0 represent anti-minority implicit bias (i.e., faster associations of the minority group and "bad" and the majority group and "good" pairings). On both IATs, Whites register positive scores significantly higher than 0. The unadjusted difference in the average D score between Whites and monoracial Blacks/Asians amounts to around .2 (both significant at the .001 level). Since the practical range of the D score is -.8 through .8 (accounting for 95 percent of the cases), the difference in implicit bias between Whites and Blacks (and Whites and Asians) amounts to 13 percent of the observed range. The .23 difference between Blacks and Whites on the IAT would have the effect of moving an individual from the 47th to 68th percentile of IAT scores. The regression-adjusted estimates in Figure 5 show these differences persist, albeit on a smaller scale, when controlling for demographic correlates.

An important finding from the IAT concerns the location of White-Blacks. As Figure 5 reveals, they fall closer to Whites on the D score than on any of the survey indicators of racial identity and affect. Without controlling for covariates, their D score is .14 points lower than Whites (highly significant), and .09 points higher than Blacks (also highly significant). At the level of explicit racial attitudes, there are conscious considerations that prompt biracial Blacks to respond as

Blacks rather than Whites (e.g. Whites are responsible for racial discrimination). But when these conscious considerations are suppressed, as in the case of the IAT, White-Blacks appear to reveal divided loyalties. In contrast, the similarity of White-Asians to Asians on the implicit measure of race bias is consistent with the explicit measures. Thus White-Blacks and White-Asians show contrasting patterns in their group alignment on the implicit, relative to explicit, indicators of affect. White-Blacks fall between Blacks and Whites at the implicit rather than explicit level, while White-Asians respond as Asians on both explicit and implicit measures of group affect. It appears there are stronger sub-conscious ties that bind White-Blacks to Whites than White-Asians to Whites; suppression of these ties produces greater implicit-explicit divergence in the case of the former.




Figure 5: Regression Estimates of Covert Racial Affect. *Note:* Higher values of the dependent variable indicate more negative affect toward the target group. Error bars reflect 95% confidence intervals. Bold segments represent 90% confidence intervals.

4.3 Political Views

As anticipated, with the exception of Whites, who are more likely to favor the Republicans, all the racial groups identify disproportionately as Democrats (see Table 3). The Democratic advantage over Republicans is largest for Blacks (50 percentage points), followed by biracial Blacks (+35), Asians (+17) and biracial Asians (+11). These data suggest that any increase in the biracial population is not good news for Republicans.

Ideology is a different matter. The sample is narrowly more conservative than liberal, with the gap being largest for Whites (-.22). The liberal advantage is greatest in the two biracial groups. While Asians are split down the middle ideologically, surprisingly, a considerable number of Blacks in our sample see themselves as conservatives. Weighting these estimates to population benchmarks reveals a narrow conservative plurality (-.03). As we will see shortly, Black conservatism reflects their views on cultural issues.

	WHITE	WHITE-BLACK	WHITE-ASIAN	BLACK	ASIAN
Republican	28.1%	9.0%	21.6%	4.8%	20.5%
Ind/Other	40.6	44.5	42.5	24.2	40.6
Democrat	31.3	45.8	36.0	71.0	38.9
Liberal	25.2	33.1	33.5	32.4	25.5
Moderate	37.2	44.6	40.2	49.9	49.5
Conservative	37.6	22.3	26.3	17.7	25.1
Sorted Democrats	51.2	43.1	56.1	37.4	40.2

Table 2: Political Views by Racial Background. Percentages reflect party identification within each group; political ideology within each group; support for both Obamacare and increased government spending; and proportion of self-reported Democrats also identifying as liberal.

Sorting is a harbinger of polarization. Democrats who also see themselves as liberals are more likely to take more extreme left-oriented stances on the issues and also believe more strongly in the misguidedness of their opponents. Given the tendency of Blacks to label themselves as conservative, it is not surprising they are the least sorted Democratic racial group. As a result,

this is one of the few instances in which White-Blacks, who are more sorted, differ significantly from Blacks. Interestingly, the most sorted group is White-Asians.




Figure 6: Logistic Regression Estimates of Partisan Sorting. *Note:* Error bars reflect 95% confidence intervals. Bold segments represent 90% confidence intervals.

As Table 3 shows, White-Asians tend to be liberal “cultural warriors.” They support same-sex marriage and abortion by a comfortable margin, and are more liberal on cultural than welfare issues. The conservatism of Blacks on this issue produces a wide gap between monoracial and biracial Blacks, with the latter group reporting even less support for both policy stances than Whites. These data suggest that increasing diversity of the U.S. population alone will not necessarily advantage one party over another. The form this diversity takes is more consequential. If growth is primarily driven by increases in the mixed-race population, candidates taking conservative positions on cultural issues will be disadvantaged.⁸

⁸The findings here are being driven by the fact that people sometimes just don’t think of abortion/same-sex marriage and Obamacare/spending as being part of the same policy domain. Anywhere between 20-30% of each subgroup is conflicted on these issues. So while in general it is true that at least one monoracial minority group is liberal on any of these issues—and biracials are always more liberal than they are—combining the issues into a single measure obscures this pattern.

	WHITE	WHITE-BLACK	WHITE-ASIAN	BLACK	ASIAN
Cultural Issues	47.9%	51.1%	64.6%	36.5%	52.6%
Social Welfare	34.9	52.8	41.2	62.3	36.6
Police Treatment	48.6	24.2	34.7	20.5	34.9

Table 3: Political Views by Racial Background. Percentages reflect support for both abortion and same-sex marriage; support for both Obamacare and increased government spending; and perceived police treatment of minorities as “Excellent” or “Good.”

Fig 7 illustrates these differences by plotting the predicted probabilities of support for same-sex marriage and abortion by racial group affiliation.⁹ Even after accounting for party identification and salience of religion to ones identity, monoracial Blacks are more likely than the remaining four groups to oppose both policy positions or hold conflicting cultural views.

The social welfare cleavage cleanly divides Blacks and Whites (Table 3). Barely one-third of Whites want more government services, compared with between half and two-thirds of White-Blacks and Blacks. Asians fall between these groups, with monoracial Asians positioned more closely to Whites than White-Asians. It would appear that on questions of social welfare, Asians are a potential Republican constituency. However, as Figure 8 reveals, although Asians are more likely than others to oppose both Obamacare and increased government spending, the probability of this pairing is low. Asians are more likely to express conflicting opinions on healthcare and the provision of government services than the remaining groups. Overall, these other groups are more likely to support than oppose both Obamacare and government spending.

Finally, how does racial background bear on assessments of police behavior? Table 3 shows a clear correlation between race and perceived police treatment of minorities. Monoracial Blacks

⁹see Appendix Table 9. These estimates are derived from a multinomial logistic regression model controlling for basic demographics, strength of racial attachments, party identification, and salience of religion to ones identity.




Figure 7: Predicted Probabilities of Support for Gay Marriage and Abortion.

hold the police in lowest regard. This is not surprising, as tensions between police and minority communities have escalated in the aftermath of Ferguson and subsequent high-profile cases of police killing unarmed black men. In contrast, monoracial Whites have the most favorable view of law enforcement as it applies to racial minorities. They are nearly 30 percentage points more likely than Blacks to say police treatment of non-Whites is “Excellent” or “Good,” but are still divided on this question.

These zero-order differences in attitudes may, of course, become attenuated when factors that influence political preferences are introduced as covariates. As Figure 9 demonstrates, perceptions of police treatment among Blacks and Asians are not markedly dissimilar once we control for




Figure 8: Predicted Probabilities of Support for Obamacare and Increased Government Spending for Provision of Services.

demographics, party identification, and strength of racial attachments and affect, with only White-Blacks significantly departing from the views of Whites. However, differences in perceptions of police (mis)treatment are not artifacts of age-related or educational differences across the groups. Instead, much of the variance in responses to this question is explained by the differences in racial identity and affect we describe above (see Appendix Table 8).

5 General Discussion and Conclusion

Historically, biracial individuals, especially those of African heritage, have generally been constrained to the one-drop rule, identifying exclusively with their minority race (Nobles 2000; White




Figure 9: Ordered Logistic Regression Estimates of Perceptions of Police Treatment of Minorities. *Note:* Higher values of the dependent variable indicate more negative perceived treatment. Error bars reflect 95% confidence intervals. Bold segments represent 90% confidence intervals.

1948; Bureau of the Census 1930). But since the changing of the U.S. Census race question in 2000, millions of Americans have begun labeling themselves with multiple races on government forms. With intermarriage rates currently at record highs—1 in 7 new marriages are interracial or interethnic (Wang 2012)—the overall proportion of the U.S. population that is of mixed-race will increase steadily over the next several decades. As members of the multiple-race population come of age, they will likely become a crucial voting bloc in the future.

Here, we have examined some of the political consequences of this changing landscape. Overall, our findings suggest that, despite our society’s increasingly blurred racial boundaries, biracial White-Black and White-Asian Americans continue to identify primarily as racial minorities, both socially and politically. All told, our data provide no support whatsoever for hegemonic accounts of racial identity, and instead are consistent with the theory that biracials view themselves as racially distinct. Despite their mixed heritage, biracials are more similar to non-Whites than to Whites in their racial and political attitudes. The pattern is especially pronounced for biracial Blacks who, more often than not, exhibit more “Blackness” in their attitudes than monoracial Blacks. Clearly, White-Blacks see themselves as *not* White. When biracial Asians express attitudes similar to those

of Whites', monoracial Asians do as well, suggesting that individuals of White-Asian heritage align with Whites only when it does not conflict with their minority group affiliation.

The findings presented above extend previous research on subgroup differences in strength of racial attachments. When conscious processing of attitudes is not possible and race becomes more a primal rather than considered identity, biracial blacks move toward the middle and show greater affinity with Whites on the IAT than on the survey indicators of racial affect. Biracial Asians are likely to see themselves as Asians both consciously and sub-consciously. One possible explanation for the consistent positioning of biracial Asians on the implicit and explicit measures of affect is that they are more distinct from Whites on multiple dimensions, including ethnicity, nationality, and language.

In sum, we find evidence that biracials stake out a distinct identity—one which occasionally diverges from their heritage groups. On matters of racial attachment, biracials partially bridge the difference between their monoracial White and non-White counterparts, but overall remain close to their minority affiliation. On political issues, however, the politics of biracial Americans generally tilts left of monoracial minority groups.¹⁰ Overall, biracials are more likely to identify as Democrats and liberals, favor more rather than less government services, and are in favor of gay rights and a woman's right to choose. Growth in the multiple-race population, at least in terms of the biracial groups considered here, seems likely to benefit the Democratic Party. The Democrats, as the party of civil rights, offer a clear ideological and value-based affinity that will be difficult for Republicans to neutralize. As the size of the multiple-race population increases, it

¹⁰These findings are consistent with those of Davenport (2016*a*), who shows that biracials of White-Black parentage are often more socially liberal than their monoracial White and Black peers.

appears inevitable that the Republican Party will either have to abandon their hard line stance on issues of concern to minorities or abandon any hopes of appealing for their votes.

Finally, a note on the context of this study. Coming in the aftermath of the Ferguson unrest and the avalanche of news reports focusing on police violence targeted at minorities, it is likely that the identity distance between biracials and Whites may have been enlarged in this relatively charged environment. At the very least, the salience of this theme is likely to have made race and ethnicity more central ingredients of biracials' sense of personal identity.

Saliency	
(Intercept)	-0.16 [-0.21; -0.10]
Demographics	
Age	-0.00 [-0.00; 0.00]
Some College	0.02 [-0.01; 0.05]
College Grad	-0.02 [-0.05; 0.02]
Female	0.04 [0.02; 0.06]
Income	-0.00 [-0.00; 0.00]
South	0.01 [-0.02; 0.03]
Racial Group	
White-Black	0.20 [0.16; 0.24]
White-Asian	0.19 [0.15; 0.23]
Black	0.27 [0.23; 0.31]
Asian	0.30 [0.26; 0.33]
R ²	
	0.13
Adj. R ²	
	0.13
Num. obs.	
	2456
RMSE	
	0.30

Table 4: Saliency of Race to Personal Identity Among Monoracial and Biracial Whites, Blacks, and Asians. *Note: Values shown are OLS estimates. 95 percent confidence intervals in brackets. Coefficients with $p < 0.05$ in **bold**.*

	To Whites	To Blacks	To Asians
Demographics			
Age	-0.00 [-0.01; 0.00]	-0.00 [-0.01; 0.01]	-0.03 [-0.04; -0.02]
Some College	-0.11 [-0.32; 0.10]	0.14 [-0.12; 0.39]	0.13 [-0.22; 0.48]
College Grad	0.19 [-0.04; 0.42]	0.11 [-0.21; 0.44]	0.63 [0.29; 0.98]
Female	-0.53 [-0.70; -0.35]	0.14 [-0.09; 0.37]	0.08 [-0.18; 0.34]
Income	0.05 [0.02; 0.08]	-0.00 [-0.04; 0.03]	0.02 [-0.02; 0.07]
South	-0.03 [-0.22; 0.15]	0.03 [-0.21; 0.26]	0.01 [-0.31; 0.33]
Racial Group			
White-Black	-0.74 [-0.97; -0.51]	-0.14 [-0.40; 0.11]	
White-Asian	-0.38 [-0.62; -0.14]		-0.28 [-0.55; -0.00]
AIC	4405.03	2507.38	1909.72
BIC	4465.23	2556.95	1957.03
Log Likelihood	-2191.51	-1243.69	-944.86
Deviance	4383.03	2487.38	1889.72
Num. obs.	1760	1051	838

Table 5: Perceptions of Linked Fate to Major Racial Groups Among Monoracial and Biracial Whites, Blacks, and Asians. *Note: Values shown are ordered logistic regression estimates with 95 percent confidence intervals. Coefficients with $p < 0.05$ in **bold**.*

	To Whites	To Blacks	To Asians
Demographics			
Age	0.01 [0.00; 0.01]	0.00 [-0.00; 0.01]	0.00 [-0.00; 0.01]
Some College	-0.11 [-0.29; 0.07]	-0.11 [-0.29; 0.07]	-0.13 [-0.31; 0.04]
College Grad	-0.22 [-0.41; -0.02]	-0.30 [-0.49; -0.10]	0.02 [-0.17; 0.21]
Female	-0.04 [-0.18; 0.11]	0.25 [0.10; 0.40]	-0.29 [-0.44; -0.14]
Income	0.05 [0.02; 0.07]	-0.02 [-0.05; 0.00]	0.03 [0.01; 0.06]
South	0.06 [-0.10; 0.22]	0.22 [0.07; 0.38]	-0.01 [-0.17; 0.15]
Racial Group			
White-Black	-0.70 [-0.93; -0.47]	1.87 [1.64; 2.11]	0.04 [-0.18; 0.26]
White-Asian	-0.67 [-0.91; -0.43]	-0.33 [-0.56; -0.09]	1.61 [1.37; 1.85]
Black	-1.92 [-2.16; -1.67]	2.41 [2.16; 2.67]	-0.31 [-0.54; -0.08]
Asian	-1.36 [-1.60; -1.12]	-0.10 [-0.33; 0.13]	1.90 [1.66; 2.15]
AIC	5828.24	6049.96	6148.63
BIC	5904.33	6126.05	6224.69
Log Likelihood	-2901.12	-3011.98	-3061.32
Deviance	5802.24	6023.96	6122.63
Num. obs.	2574	2574	2568

Table 6: Perceptions of Closeness to Major Racial Groups Among Monoracial and Biracial Whites, Blacks, and Asians. *Note: Values shown are ordered logistic regression estimates with 95 percent confidence intervals. Coefficients with $p < 0.05$ in **bold**.*

	White-Asian IAT	White-Black IAT
(Intercept)	0.17 [0.06; 0.29]	0.18 [0.07; 0.29]
Demographics		
Age	-0.00 [-0.00; 0.00]	-0.00 [-0.00; 0.00]
Some College	-0.05 [-0.12; 0.01]	0.02 [-0.04; 0.07]
College Grad	0.01 [-0.05; 0.08]	0.05 [-0.01; 0.12]
Female	0.00 [-0.05; 0.05]	-0.04 [-0.09; 0.01]
Income	0.01 [0.00; 0.02]	-0.00 [-0.01; 0.01]
South	0.02 [-0.04; 0.08]	0.06 [0.01; 0.11]
Racial Group		
White-Black	-0.21 [-0.28; -0.14]	
Black	-0.23 [-0.29; -0.16]	
White-Asian		-0.13 [-0.20; -0.07]
Asian		-0.23 [-0.30; -0.16]
R ²	0.06	0.04
Adj. R ²	0.06	0.04
Num. obs.	1036	1110
RMSE	0.40	0.42

Table 7: Implicit Affect Toward Major Racial Groups Among Monoracial and Biracial Whites, Blacks, and Asians. *Note: Values shown are OLS point estimates with 95 percent confidence intervals. Coefficients with $p < 0.05$ in **bold**.*

	More Negative
Demographics	
Age	− 0.02 [−0.02; −0.01]
Some College	− 0.31 [−0.53; −0.09]
College Grad	−0.23 [−0.47; 0.00]
Female	0.08 [−0.11; 0.26]
Income	−0.01 [−0.04; 0.02]
South	−0.14 [−0.34; 0.06]
Racial Group	
White-Black	0.39 [0.09; 0.69]
White-Asian	0.25 [−0.06; 0.55]
Black	−0.18 [−0.53; 0.17]
Asian	0.09 [−0.23; 0.41]
Identity and Affect	
Linked Fate	0.00 [−0.11; 0.11]
Salience of Race	0.33 [0.23; 0.42]
Closeness to Whites	− 0.41 [−0.53; −0.28]
Closeness to Blacks	0.25 [0.13; 0.36]
Closeness to Asians	−0.09 [−0.20; 0.03]
IAT Score	− 0.24 [−0.45; −0.02]
Party Identification	
Independent/Other	1.07 [0.80; 1.34]
Democrat	1.33 [1.05; 1.60]
AIC	3677.94
BIC	3788.51
Log Likelihood	−1818.97
Deviance	3637.94
Num. obs.	1861

Table 8: Perceptions of Police Treatment of Minorities Among Monoracial and Biracial Whites, Blacks, and Asians. *Note: Values shown are ordered logistic regression estimates with 95 percent confidence intervals. Coefficients with $p < 0.05$ in **bold**.*

	Conflicting Views	Oppose Both
(Intercept)	-0.06 [-1.02; 0.89]	-1.89 [-2.98; -0.79]
Demographics		
Age	0.00 [-0.00; 0.01]	0.02 [0.01; 0.03]
Some College	-0.35 [-0.65; -0.06]	-0.04 [-0.39; 0.31]
College Grad	-0.39 [-0.71; -0.07]	0.07 [-0.30; 0.45]
Female	-0.30 [-0.55; -0.04]	-0.37 [-0.67; -0.07]
Income	0.02 [-0.02; 0.06]	-0.03 [-0.08; 0.01]
South	0.30 [0.03; 0.57]	0.27 [-0.04; 0.58]
Racial Group		
White-Black	0.51 [0.10; 0.92]	0.50 [0.02; 0.97]
White-Asian	-0.40 [-0.83; 0.04]	-0.25 [-0.74; 0.25]
Black	1.09 [0.60; 1.59]	1.61 [1.06; 2.16]
Asian	0.38 [-0.06; 0.82]	0.54 [0.01; 1.06]
Identity and Affect		
Linked Fate	0.02 [-0.13; 0.18]	0.06 [-0.11; 0.24]
Salience of Race	-0.23 [-0.36; -0.09]	-0.41 [-0.56; -0.25]
Closeness to Whites	-0.03 [-0.19; 0.13]	0.01 [-0.19; 0.20]
Closeness to Blacks	-0.05 [-0.21; 0.10]	-0.10 [-0.28; 0.08]
Closeness to Asians	-0.04 [-0.19; 0.12]	0.00 [-0.18; 0.19]
IAT Score	-0.08 [-0.38; 0.23]	0.24 [-0.12; 0.59]
Salience of Religion	0.54 [0.43; 0.65]	1.14 [1.00; 1.29]
Party Identification		
Independent/Other	-1.19 [-1.58; -0.81]	-1.87 [-2.28; -1.46]
Democrat	-1.87 [-2.27; -1.46]	-2.93 [-3.40; -2.47]
AIC	3103.70	3103.70
BIC	3324.45	3324.45
Log Likelihood	-1511.85	-1511.85
Deviance	3023.70	3023.70
Num. obs.	1875	1875

Table 9: Cultural Preferences Among Monoracial and Biracial Whites, Blacks, and Asians. *Note: Dependent variable measures whether respondents support both abortion and same-sex marriage, oppose both, or have conflicting views on these issues. Omitted category is “Supports Both.” Values shown are multinomial logistic regression estimates with 95 percent confidence intervals. Coefficients with $p < 0.05$ in **bold**.*

	Conflicting Views	Oppose Both
(Intercept)	1.07 [0.11; 2.03]	1.31 [0.26; 2.35]
Demographics		
Age	-0.01 [-0.02; -0.00]	0.02 [0.01; 0.03]
Some College	0.05 [-0.24; 0.35]	0.18 [-0.16; 0.52]
College Grad	-0.34 [-0.67; -0.01]	-0.50 [-0.86; -0.14]
Female	0.18 [-0.07; 0.43]	0.17 [-0.11; 0.45]
Income	0.00 [-0.04; 0.04]	0.06 [0.01; 0.10]
South	0.42 [0.15; 0.70]	0.64 [0.34; 0.95]
Racial Group		
White-Black	-0.48 [-0.89; -0.07]	-0.57 [-1.01; -0.12]
White-Asian	-0.12 [-0.55; 0.31]	0.10 [-0.35; 0.55]
Black	0.15 [-0.31; 0.61]	0.06 [-0.49; 0.60]
Asian	0.41 [-0.05; 0.87]	0.78 [0.29; 1.27]
Identity and Affect		
Linked Fate	-0.01 [-0.16; 0.14]	0.01 [-0.15; 0.17]
Salience of Race	-0.18 [-0.30; -0.05]	-0.29 [-0.44; -0.15]
Closeness to Whites	0.16 [-0.01; 0.32]	0.33 [0.15; 0.52]
Closeness to Blacks	-0.06 [-0.22; 0.10]	-0.45 [-0.62; -0.27]
Closeness to Asians	-0.01 [-0.17; 0.15]	-0.20 [-0.38; -0.02]
IAT Score	0.37 [0.07; 0.68]	0.58 [0.24; 0.91]
Salience of Religion	0.05 [-0.06; 0.16]	0.16 [0.04; 0.28]
Party Identification		
Independent/Other	-0.73 [-1.20; -0.26]	-1.40 [-1.82; -0.97]
Democrat	-1.54 [-2.01; -1.07]	-3.74 [-4.23; -3.25]
AIC	3227.37	3227.37
BIC	3447.90	3447.90
Log Likelihood	-1573.69	-1573.69
Deviance	3147.37	3147.37
Num. obs.	1864	1864

Table 10: Social Welfare Preferences Among Monoracial and Biracial Whites, Blacks, and Asians. *Note: Dependent variable measures whether respondents support the Affordable Care Act and believe government should provide more services even if it means an increase in spending, oppose the ACA/Obamacare and believe government should provide fewer services to reduce spending, or have conflicting views on these issues. Omitted category is “Supports Both.” Values shown are multinomial logistic regression estimates with 95 percent confidence intervals. Coefficients with $p < 0.05$ in **bold**.*

	Sorted
(Intercept)	-0.99 [-1.42; -0.57]
Demographics	
Age	-0.01 [-0.02; -0.01]
Some College	0.05 [-0.18; 0.27]
College Grad	0.50 [0.26; 0.74]
Female	0.12 [-0.07; 0.30]
Income	-0.01 [-0.04; 0.02]
South	-0.42 [-0.62; -0.21]
Racial Group	
White-Black	0.57 [0.29; 0.85]
White-Asian	0.56 [0.27; 0.86]
Black	0.42 [0.12; 0.73]
Asian	0.19 [-0.11; 0.50]
AIC	2887.12
BIC	2951.65
Log Likelihood	-1432.56
Deviance	2843.63
Num. obs.	2607

Table 11: Party Sorting Among Monoracial and Biracial Whites, Blacks, and Asians. *Note: Values shown are logistic regression estimates with 95 percent confidence intervals. Coefficients with $p < 0.05$ in **bold**.*

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